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HIERARCHICAL REPRESENTATION OF LEGAL 
KNOWLEDGE WITH METAPROGRAMMING 
IN LOGIC 
JONAS BARKLUND AND ANDREAS HAMFELT 
D We present an application of metaprogramming in logic that, unlike most 
metaprogramming applications, is not primarily concerned with controlling 
the execution of logic programs. Metalevel computation is used to define 
theories from schemata that were either given explicitly or obtained by 
abstraction from other theories. Our main application is a representation 
of legal knowledge in a metalogic programming language. We argue that 
legal knowledge is multilayered and therefore a single level representation 
language lacks the needed expressiveness. We show that legal rules can be 
partitioned into primary, secondary, tertiary, quaternary, and higher level 
rules. Our classification enables us to define a multilevel model of legal 
knowledge and a one-to-one correspondence with levels of metaprogram- 
ming in logic. We show that this framework has a potential for capturing 
important legal interpretation principles such as analogia legis, lex specialis 
Zegi generuli derogut, etc. We have a running example from commercial aw 
that utilizes rules up to the tertiary level, emphasizing unulogiu legis. The 
example is expressed in a multilevel metalogic programming language that 
provides a naming convention and employs reflection between levels. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Metalogic programming provides an expressive power that facilitates an intelligible 
representation of complex knowledge. We exploit a framework based on that 
proposed by Bowen and Kowalski [4, 291 for representing multilayered legal 
knowledge and, in particular, show how the reflection principles naturally mirror 
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the dependency relation between object theories and metatheories in this field. 
Contrary to most applications of metaprogramming in logic, this application uses 
metaprogramming for a problem other than the control of execution of logic 
programs. For example, rules whose direct execution does not contribute to a 
solution for the case at hand can nevertheless be abstracted as schemata and 
modified to suit the case, given some metarules about analogy in a given setting. 
The application illustrates that a reflection architecture where several metalogical 
levels can coexist is not only of theoretical interest, but has practical use. 
1.1. Representation of Legal Knowledge and Legal Philosophy 
This paper primarily addresses computing science, not law, so we confine ourselves 
to some brief remarks concerning how our idea of law relates to legal philosophy. 
Legal philosophy embraces, of course, various proposals for models of legal 
knowledge. The one suggested, e.g., by Hart [25] is close to our notion. Hart claims 
that legal knowledge is partitioned into at least two levels. Besides rules of 
obligation there exist also rules about rules of obligation. Hart terms the former 
primary rules and the latter secondary rules. Secondary rules specify how to find 
applicable primaty rules, how to interpret them, how to solve inconsistency between 
them, how to construct new rules from existing rules (e.g., by analogy-in short, 
how to reason about primary rules. 
A lawyer must also select, interpret, and construct secondary rules appropri- 
ately. Therefore, we propose that Hart’s secondary level be refined into additional 
levels. Consider, for instance, secondary rules for analogy in disparate legal fields. 
Structurally these rules are similar, but their detailed content is different because 
different interests must be maintained when reasoning by analogy in separate 
fields. When secondary rules are constructed, these interests must obviously be 
considered, necessitating reasoning on a tertiary level. If tertiary rules encode the 
particular interests to be considered in the respective legal fields, there exists also 
knowledge explaining why certain interests are protectionworthy whereas others 
are not. This knowledge must be taken into account when tertiary rules are 
constructed, requiring reasoning at a quaternary level, etc. For example, secondary 
rules must restrain analogical reasoning: in commercial law, when it would other- 
wise impose new burdens upon consumers, and in penal law, when it would 
otherwise decrease predictability of penalty. Tertiary rules specify for these particu- 
lar legal fields that consumers and predictability are protectionworthy. Quaternary 
rules explain that a property such as predictability is protectionworthy in penal law, 
because it strengthens “legal security” (rule of law), etc. This simple exam- 
ple illustrates the multilayered structure of legal knowledge and, also, one of our 
other points: higher-level rules are, in general, no more difficult to comprehend 
than lower-level rules. 
We claim that, regardless of its level, a statutory rule can never be conceived as 
anything more pretentious than a proposal for a rule. Before being imposed upon 
anybody as law, it must be accepted by a higher level assessment. Some legal 
writers have analyzed law similarly, e.g., Gray who says that “statutes are sources of 
law . . . not part of the law itself’ [18, p. 2761 meaning that statutory rules are not 
rules to be applied directly by the courts-they have no independent interpreta- 
tion: “their meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with the meaning declared by 
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the courts and no other meaning that they are imposed upon the community as law” 
[19, p. 121. 
As a consequence, a statutory rule will not appear in our representation as a 
program clause, but as a schema that can be instantiated and transformed before 
being used as a program clause. Similarly, higher level rules will also appear as 
schemata belonging to even higher levels. 
1.2. Legal Knowledge and Logic Programming 
Representation of legal knowledge in logic has a long tradition. It could even be 
argued that logic was invented for assessing valid arguments in, for example, legal 
disputes. Among the early contributors we note, e.g., Thomas ab Aquino and 
Descartes. In the Cartesian philosophy arguments are constructed from fundamen- 
tal axioms through strictly logical proof chains. More recently, logicians such as von 
Wright [43] have developed logical systems for a legal discourse. These systems 
have, to various extents, been capable of expressing legal notions. However, they 
have been practically useless for mechanizing legal arguments, because theorem 
proving in these logical systems has not been efficiently automatable. 
Logic programming is concerned with subsets of first-order logic that can be 
computed efficiently on computers. Therefore it has been a natural step to try to 
formalize legal notions as logic programs, in particular Prolog [91 programs. Sergot 
et al. represented parts of the British Nationality Act as a logic program [361. We 
have attempted to go beyond what they showed possible, i.e., representing “flat” 
statutes, to also capture the hierarchical and dynamic structure of law. Legal 
reasoning is not simply rule application, but rather a process of interpretation or 
even construction of rules from schematic knowledge [20]. 
We shall investigate secondary and higher level rules with respect to their 
l formalization in first-order predicate calculus, 
l affinity to metalevels in logic, and 
l realization by metainterpreters in a runnable loagic program. 
1.3. Terminology 
As an example domain in this research, we have chosen hire of goods, a field 
lacking regulation in the Swedish legislation and ruled by analogies from other 
branches, e.g., from commercial law. We take into account two regulations in 
commercial law: the Swedish counterparts to the Sale of Goods Act @GA) and the 
Consumer Sale of Goods Act (CSGA). These regulations are examples of what we 
call legal sources, which include also any other legal material that lawyers may 
consult. 
Throughout the paper legal maxims and notions are denoted by Latin expres- 
sions taken from Swedish jurisprudence. We have chosen not to translate them, 
because similar or identical expressions denote closely related notions in several 
legal systems. We briefly explain the expressions here and provide, when the 
account so requires, a closer description. 
l The notion analogia Zegis is an inference in legal reasoning characterized by 
the conclusion that a legal rule in statute law ought to be applied analogically 
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to a case not subsumed under its linguistic meaning. The inference results in 
construction of new rules, termed constructed rules in this paper, thus 
yielding what we will call a virtual legal source. 
l Inference e conrratio is characterized by the conclusion that a rule existing in 
statute law must not be applied analogically to a case. 
l The maxim lex specialis legi generali derogat states that the specific law 
abrogates the more general. 
l The maxim lex postetior legi priori derogat states that a more recent law 
abrogates an older law. 
2. LOGIC PROGRAMMING AND METAPROGRAMMING 
2.1. Metalogic and Metaprogramming 
A metalanguage is a language where all or some of the terms are names for 
syntactical entities of some (possibly the same) language. This other language is 
usually referred to as the object language. This distinction between a language and 
its metalanguage has been known for some time in mathematics and logic. Hilbert 
utilized a similar distinction in an attempt at an intuitively convincing proof of the 
consistency of classical mathematics; proofs in an axiomatic theory of classical 
mathematics were made the object of a mathematical investigation termed meta- 
mathematics or proof theory [261. Gbdel numbers, used to represent mathematical 
formulas, can also be viewed as a metalanguage for mathematics [17]. The terms 
“object language” and “metalanguage” were introduced by Tarski when specifying 
adequacy criteria for definitions of truth for formal languages [38]. 
The idea of representing formulas and terms of an object language as terms in a 
metalanguage has been applied also in computing science. Here the languages are 
usually programming languages and syntactic entities of a programming language 
are represented as data structures, operated upon by programs written in a 
metaprogramming language. This was first demonstrated in the universal Turing 
machine [39]. The idea is also embodied in the processing units of all computers 
based on the von Neumann model [33]; instructions are stored as bits and bytes in 
the memory chips of the computer, being interpreted by a microprogram (or 
directly by electronic circuits). We can thus think of the microprogram as a 
metaprogram, and when modifying the microprogram, the interpretation of the 
instructions is changed. 
2.2. Metaprogramming in Logic 
Amalgamation. We take up the idea, advocated by Bowen and Kowalski 14, 291, 
that one can perform metalevel reasoning in a formal (logic) object language L, 
which has been amalgamated with a suitable metalanguage M. 
The idea is to find a representation of the expressions of the object language as 
terms in the metalanguage and to represent provability of the object language by a 
predicate symbol Demo in the metalanguage. 
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More formally, the amalgamation requires: 
1. A naming convention that associates every expression E in L with a ground 
term _Z in M. 
2. A representation of provability in L by a program Pr for the predicate Demo 
in M. 
3. A meta-to-object linking rule and an object-to-meta linking rule,’ stating that 
-- 
Prk-, Demo(A,B) and A I-~ B 
A k.L B 
--. 
Prk-, Demo(A,B) 
These linking rules allow an object level execution to be replaced by a 
metalevel execution and vice versa. Weyhrauch [42] termed these rules 
“reflection principles.” (This notion originated with Feferman [13], who used 
it for a related concept.) 
By letting L and M be the same language one has the possibility to use an 
arbitrary number of levels, because, e.g., 
-- 
Prk-, Demo(A,B) 
-- 7 
Pr, I-~ Demo,(E, Demo( A, B)) 
where (Pr, Demo) and (Pr,, Demo, > can be the same. 
Naming of Expressions. We call the representation in the metalanguage of an 
object language term or formula E a name for E and write it here as E. Nothing 
in this paper depends on which naming convention is used. The particular problem 
with naming conventions in logic programming languages lies in maintaining the 
scope of variables. We have previously discussed a solution to that problem using 
structural-descriptive names [2], but there are alternative solutions, e.g., using 
explicit quantifiers as in Metaprolog [5]. Reflective Prolog has structural-descriptive 
names but uses an abbreviated syntax [lo]. The Giidel language has no syntax for 
names at all, but relies on having an abstract data type for names, yielding a form 
of structural-descriptive names [27]. See also the discussion by Cervesato and Rossi 
[71. 
Under certain naming conventions, a name for a name for a formula, such as 
-- 
Demo( A, B), 
may be very long and unreadable, but a good metaprogramming system would 
support more convenient notations, abstracting from the actual representation. 
Given a representation of a language in another language, we can express all 
programs of the first (object) language in the second (metal language. We can 
reason about well-formed syntactical object language entities in the metalanguage 
but also about “unsaturated” linguistic entities. This adds to the expressive power. 
The following example, which is due to Frege [14], illustrates the concept. In an 
‘Our terms “meta-to-object” and “object-to-meta” refer to the directions in which information is 
transferred. The terms “downward” and “upward” in this context have been confused in literature and 
we prefer to abandon them in favor of the preceding notions. 
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object language about arithmetic, say, expressions uch as 42 + 3 x 5 are meaning- 
ful, but, e.g., unsaturated expressions uch as ( I2 + 3 x ( ) meaningless. ( )2 + 3 x 
( ) could, however, form part of a meaningful expression in a metalanguage .g., 
“( >’ + 3 X ( ) is a function.” 2 We shall use the notion of an unsaturated name, 
which is to be understood as an unsaturated expression. 
As an expression of an object language, a string P(x, t) + q r\R(y, z) would 
be ill-formed and meaningless, but in a metalanguage an unsaturated name 
P( X, z) + q r\R( y, z) can form part of a meaningful statement about clauses in 
the object language, because q is a metavariable. 
In cases where object variables may actually occur, it is important to distinguish 
between them and metavariables. Our notation allows us to do so: P( x, u,q is a 
term that is an unsaturated name for an atomic sentence of arity 3. Substituting, 
e.g., J (an object variable name> for u in the term yields the saturated name 
P( X, y, z). In fact, any substitution (u/a), where (Y is a name for a term would 
yield a saturated name. When (Y is an arbitrary term, however, the result of 
applying {u/a) need not be a name for any expression. In a many-sorted language 
a substitution of anything but a name of a term for u would not be permitted. 
Because a name is itself a term, we can imagine constructing a name for a name. 
In our syntax each naming level will add another bar on top. For example, P( x, u, q 
is a (saturated) name for an (unsaturated) name for an atomic sentence. 
If we have only saturated expressions at the metalevel, we can for efficiency 
replace the metalevel computation with an object level computation. The foregoing 
object-to-meta linking rule illustrates this possibility in logic programming. 
2.3. A Logic Metaprogramming Language 
Let us now describe the metaprogramming language that we are going to use in 
what follows. The details of the language are still under development; in this paper 
we will refer to it as Al10y.~ 
We can briefly characterize Alloy as Prolog with reflection, a naming conven- 
tion, classical negation, and multiple theories. To provide a base for a somewhat 
more detailed description of these additions, we first characterize pure Prolog’s 
computation for propositional Horn clause programs through the following simple 
interpreter [32], which assumes that each clause C of the program to be run is 
provided by an additional fact demo(C) in the metaprogram, where c is a term 
naming Cz4 
prove(GlAG2):-prove(G1). prove(G2). 
prove(H):-prove(H+-B), prove(B). 
Note the symmetry in the second clause between the treatment of the rule (H + B) 
and the goal (B). 
In what follows we will use typewriter font for formulas in our description 
language, which can be thought of as a Prolog-like programming language for 
2This is clearly an archaic way of viewing functions, but that is beside the point. 
3AMALGAMATED METALanguageS. 
4The fact that this interpreter leaves unspecified important features such as unification and 
backtracking is not important here because Alloy behaves like Prolog in these respects. 
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running the metainterpreter prove. We will use italic typeface and mathematical 
symbols for expressions in Alloy. In a metainterpreter, the expressions of the 
knowledge representation language need to be represented as terms in the descrip- 
tion language as well, but we have no reason to define this representation. 
Reflection and Naming. Alloy has implicit5 meta-to-object reflection, inspired by 
that of Reflective Prolog developed by Costantini and Lanzarone 1101, and explicit 
object-to-meta reflection. The following two additional clauses for the meta-to- 
object and object-to-meta linking rules, respectively, add this functionality to the 
previous interpreter. 
prove(C) :-names(CN, C), prove (demo(CN)). 
prove idemo( :-names (GN, G) , prove(G). 
The relation names provides the naming convention for the knowledge representa- 
tion language in itself; we need not specify this convention precisely either. The 
meta-to-object reflection supports only program clauses. It is intended that pro- 
gram clauses are constructed through a computation at the metalevel and then 
reflected down to the object level. Operationally, clauses directly given at the 
object level are tried before clauses computed at the metalevel. Of course the 
language processor does not compute clauses blindly at the metalevel and then try 
them at the object level, but considers the atom to be proved, much like the 
“indexing” taking place in the clause selection process of all modern Prolog 
systems. Like Reflective Prolog, the language processor also needs to prevent 
infinite loops caused by going back and forth between metalevel and object level, 
and loops caused by perpetually rising to higher metalevels. 
It is sometimes necessary to go from a ground expression to a name for it, or 
vice versa, even when not going between levels. For this purpose, we introduce in 
the language a reserved predicate symbol name, such that for any ground term (Y, 
name(Z, a) is provable in any theory. We can add this to the interpreter by the 
clause 
prove(name(TN, T)) :-names(TN, T). 
In succeeding text we will also employ the abbreviated syntax X’ to mean “the 
term Y for which name(Y, X> holds” (for several examples, see Section 5.1). Note 
that for an expression (Y, C-u denotes the literal name of (Y, whereas (Y ’ denotes the 
name of whatever (Y stands for. Note also that for a constant c, C = c’, but for a 
variable X, X is a variable name, whereas X’ is the name of the value of the 
variable X. Operationally, the computation of X’ from X may have to be delayed 
until X is ground [3]. 
Negation. Representation of legal knowledge appears to require both classical 
negation [22, 361 and negation as failure [8, 301. Our language, therefore, contains 
both these forms of negation. We will write the classical negation of 4 as -, 4 and 
negation as failure to prove I$ as “not 4.” Alloy has the same semantics for 
negation as that specified by Gelfond and Lifschitz [161, except that inconsistency is 
‘Implicit in the sense that the language has no means for the programmer to actually request a 
reflection operation in this direction. 
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not detected. (We use their terminology in the following text.) 
We can characterize this form of negation through the following transformation 
process. Formulas containing negations are normalized, through equivalences uch 
as 7 (& A &) @ 1 +i V --, &, pushing negations deeper until only atomic formu- 
las are negated. A new predicate symbol p’ is introduced for each predicate 
symbol p in the program, and every literal 7 p(x,, . . ., x,> is replaced by its 
positive form, p’(xI, x,X In particular, this means that an extended program clause 
on the form 7 p(xI, . . . , x,) + I,!J is replaced by the general clause p'(xl, . . . , x,) + 
ICI+, where the formula I/J’ is the positive form of I/J. Moreover, we permit 
a program clause on the form p(x,,...,xk) ++ $ as an abbreviation for the 
two program clauses p(x,, . . . , xk) + +!I and 7 p(xl,. . . , xk) + 7 I,!J. 
This schema is incomplete in that contrapositives are never used for proofs.6 If 
this only appears as a disadvantage, let us point out that this gives a programmer 
some control over proofs that involve negation. 
Multiple Theories. The multiple theories of Alloy can be explained by adding 
another argument, which is a name of a theory, to the prove relation while 
renaming it to an infix relation :. We have used terms as names of theories; these 
names do not normally contain any representation of the axioms making up the 
theory as a part and can even be mere symbols [31]. However, the theories should 
be partially ordered through a binary relation meta-theory (that must be 
transitive, nonsymmetric, and irreflexive) in the description language. That two 
names Tl and T2 of theories stand in this relation means that the theory named by 
T2 is a metatheory for the theory named by T,. The meta-to-object reflection will 
attempt to prove the demo goal in every metatheory of the current theory. 
The difference between this metainterpreter and the first summarizes the 
difference between Alloy and Prolog: 
T:GlAG2:-T:Gl, T:G2. 
T:H:-T:H+-B, T:B. 
T:C:- 
meta-theory(T, M), names(Cn, C), 
names(TN, T) , M:demo(TN, CN). 
T : demo( ON, GN):-names(GN, G), namestON, O), 0:G. 
That some clause C is an axiom of a theory T is represented by the presence of a 
clause T:C in the description language (we may also write T:C, & --- &C, when all 
clauses C,, . . . , C, are axioms of T). The clause C often has a conclusion 
demo(o, 0). Such clauses are intended to be used with the meta-to-object reflec- 
tion rule, reflecting down an instantiation of 5 (assuming that it contains metavari- 
ables) to the theory denoted by the instantiation of a. 
EfJicienq. Even though we have used an interpreter in the preceding text to 
convey an understanding of the concepts of our language, it is important to point 
6For example, 7 a cannot be proved from the two program clauses b + a and 7 b. 
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We have extended Warren’s abstract Prolog machine [41] with support for the 
foregoing features. At the time of writing, the compiler and the abstract machine 
are being implemented and tested. Currently it seems that programs that involve 
no reflection run at exactly the same speed as corresponding Prolog programs. 
Many common uses of reflection are also inexpensive. We will report on this 
implementation, together with an exact definition of the language, when the 
implementation is fully operational. 
2.4. Legal Knowledge and Metaprogramming in Logic 
For many domains, including the legal domain, the knowledge about the object 
level is incomplete. Our metaprogramming methodology is based on an approach 
where a metaprogram constructs a program for the problem at hand. This can be 
repeated at several levels; in the following text, we shall present a metametapro- 
gram that defines a theory consisting of a metaprogram that, in turn, defines a 
theory containing a program that finally solves the object level problem. 
Earlier approaches to metaprogramming have often limited themselves to speak 
about object level expressions as atomic symbols. The metaknowledge in those 
programs could be, e.g., about the probability that a certain class of rules would be 
applicable in a certain situation [12] or the metaprograms could compute strategies 
and plans for the application of rules [6]. Our approach is different in that names 
for formulas are considered to be compound entities that can be composed and 
dismembered to form new names. 
A characteristic for metaprogramming is that programming is done at several 
levels. These levels may correspond to levels present in the problem domain (see 
the next section for a further discussion). In the legal domain this is particularly 
obvious: law is structured such that some rules tell how other rules may be applied, 
interpreted, and transformed. Quoting Hart [25]: 
They specify the ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained, 
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined 
1~. 921 
and 
. . .introduce new rules of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in 
various ways determine their incidence or control their operations [p. 791. 
Our approach for using metaprogramming in logic emphasizes knowledge repre- 
sentation. The fact that the knowledge in the problem domain conceptually belongs 
to multiple levels has been reflected as closely as possible. Sterling [37] has 
investigated another approach for using metaprogramming in logic for multilevel 
problem solving in which different tasks are,alloted to the different levels: planning 
is carried out at the metametalevel, methods are applied at the metalevel, etc. 
2.5. Knowledge Representation and Metaprogramming in Logic 
In this work we are representing open textured knowledge (i.e., knowledge that 
requires interpretation) through the use of interpretation principles and other 
higher-level knowledge at the metalevel. The field of law is comparatively well 
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analyzed, and much of this higher-level knowledge, in particular interpretation 
principles, forms part of law itself. In other domains there may not have formed a 
body of such knowledge that is specific to the domain itself. Rather, one applies 
metaknowledge that is common to a group of related domains, and sometimes 
generally applicable. 
We believe that domains of knowledge form a spectrum with a varying degree of 
domain-specific metaknowledge, where the field of law appears near one end of the 
spectrum. Other studies, for example, Sterling’s work mentioned previously, con- 
cern metaknowledge for domains with less perceivable higher-level knowledge. Not 
surprisingly, there is a common tendency in both our studies and theirs: knowledge 
at lower metalevels appears to be more domain specific, whereas knowledge at 
higher metalevels is often more generally applicable. 
For example, in the following text and elsewhere we discuss quite general 
principles in the field of law, for example, concerning analogies and protected 
interests. We are certain that this knowledge is sufficiently general to be used for 
governing reasoning in other domains also. 
3. LAYERS OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE 
To motivate the approach chosen we shall describe in detail our concept of the 
structure of legal knowledge in this section. The purpose is to convey an under- 
standing of how rules at different levels operate together, as illustrated by Figure 1. 
Let us start by looking at an ordinary provision (Section 10) in the Swedish Sale 
of Goods Act, shown in Figure l(1). This provision is not only applicable to sale of 
goods. For example, provision 1 could be analogically applied to hire of goods, or 
extensively interpreted, or interpreted e contra&, etc. That is, provision (1) 
embraces many primary rules. One, but only one, of these is the rule given by a 
literal reading of the tokens building the provision. Provision (1) is a schema for all 
these rules. We call it a secondary schema because this schema is about primary 
rules and thus conceptually belongs to the secondary level. 
The relation between secondary schemata and primary rules is given by sec- 
ondary rules. For example, the relation between schema 1 and real primary rules, 
such as (2) in Figure 1, is given by secondary rules for analogia legis that in 
commercial law could look like (4). 
Correspondingly, tertiary schemata for secondary rules and tertiary rules exist 
that give the relation between these schemata and the secondary rules. The tertiary 
schema from which the secondary rule (4) originates is shown as (3) in Figure 1. 
Information about the relation between this schema and secondary rules, such as 
rule (4), is given by tertiary rules, e.g., (5) in the figure. 
Schematic descriptions of rules at various levels are important. We have argued 
elsewhere [20] that a lawyer has only schematic knowledge concerning legal rules; 
each adjudication comprises an interpretation of schemata for legal rules and 
results in the construction of specialized rules applicable solely to the case at hand. 
An obvious example is rule (4) for analogia legis in commercial law. This secondary 
rule is not generally applicable. It is the result of an interpretation at levels above 
the secondary and is only applicable in an individual adjudication, i.e., in a 
particular legal case. In another legal case, the interpretation at the levels above 
the secondary may yield another formulation of rule (4). Rules, such as this one, 
are thus generated for each individual adjudication and there exists a diversity of 
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in a way that imposes a burden upon the consumer. 
(3) A tertiary schema: 
A certain rule may be applied to a case 
not subsumed. or at least not with 
certainty subsumed, under the rule’s 
linguistic wording if the case is not the 
object of a particular explicit rule, if the 
case has a substantial similarity to 
those the rule is intended for, if 
interests of some importance, which 
the rule is intended to meet. support 
such an application, and if no such 
interests are contravened by it. 
(4) A proposal for a secondary rule: 
SGA, Sect. 10. may be applied to a case not 
subsumed, or at least not with certainty 
subsumed. under its linguistic wording if the 
case is not the object of a particular explicit 
rule in any act belonging to commercial law, if 
according to the present conception of justice 
in commercial law, the case has a substantial 
similarity to those Sect. 10 is intended for, if 
such an application is without detriment to 
consumers, and if protection of free compe- 
tition is not contravened by it. 
(1) A secondary schema: 
SGA, Sect. 10. 
If the goods are to be sent by the 
vendor from one place to another 
where it shall be received by the 
vendee. then it should be presumed 
delivered, either when left to an 
independent carrying trader or, in 
case it is to be shipped, when 
brought within planking for 
shipping. 
FIGURE 1. Schemata and rules. 
(2) A proposal for a primary rule: 
If the goods are to be sent by the 
letter from one place to another 
where it shall be received by the 
hirer, then it should be presumed 
delivered, either when left to an 
independent carrying trader or. in 
case it is to be shipped, when 
brought within planking for 
shipping. 
possible formulations. What they have in common is that they all originate from a 
common schematic description 3 (compare preceding text), which in this case 
conceptually belongs to the tertiary level. Description (3) originates from the legal 
literature. 
Figure 2 illustrates the levels of legal knowledge, where the naming has been 
made explicit. 
4. REPRESENTATION OF LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AS LOGIC PROGRAMS 
AT MULTIPLE LEVELS 
In the previous section we accounted for the existence of multiple levels of legal 
knowledge. We now proceed to associate the legal notions with levels in a 
metaprogramming hierarchy. Of course, the sample programs can only be 
approximations of the actual legal notions. 
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Level 4 T4 quaternary rule 
-Cd* for quaternary 
schemata tertiary rules 
_-______---- _-------_--- 
Level 3 l-3 tertiary rule 
tertiary “names” for 
schemata secondary rules 
________-_--_----_ 
Level 2 T2 secondary rule 
secondary “names” for 
schemata primary rules 
____________________--- 
Level 1 Tl primary rule 
FIGURE 2. Levels of legal knowledge. 
Table 1 shows informally the relation between levels of legal rules and the 
metaprogramming hierarchy. As can be seen in the table, data correspond 
to individuals of the domain, primary rules to programs operating on data, sec- 
ondary rules to metaprograms operating on programs, tertiary rules to meta- 
metaprograms operating on metaprograms, and so on. 
4.1. The Domain Leuel 
At the domain level, data represent the individual objects (physical or nonphysical) 
under legal consideration. This universe of discourse is dependent on the branch of 
law and the particular case and we do not wish to consider any particular ontology. 
4.2. The Primary Level 
At the primary level, programs are used to represent rules of obligation. An 
investigation of a representation for this level has been carried out by Sergot et al. 
[36]. We assume a representation along these lines. For example, the primary rule 
given by a literal reading of provision (1) (in Figure 1) could be represented by the 
TABLE 1. Levels in logic and law. 
metametaprograms t, tertiary rules 
metaprograms e secondary rules 
programs ++ primary rules 
data * universe of discourse 
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logic program 
casuistic(sgu): 
presumed_delivered( Y, G) + 
vendor( X, G) A 
vendee( Y, G) A 
shall_send_to( X, G, D, 1 A (6) 
shall_receive(Y, G, 0,) A 
ought_to_be_sent_fiom(G, D2) A 
(left-t _ _’ d o an m ependent_canying_trader(X,G, D,) V 
brought_within_planking_for_shipping (X, G, 0,)). 
The theory casuistic(sgu) represents the literal reading of the Sale of Goods Act. 
4.3. The Secondary Level 
At the secondary level, metaprograms represent secondary rules. A secondary rule 
being a statement about schematic descriptions of primary rules corresponds to a 
metaprogram being a statement about unsaturated names for programs (cf. follow- 
ing text). For example, the secondary rule (4) (in Figure 1) is a statement about 
existing rules in commercial law. The rule gives a description of how new primary 
rules may be constructed by analogy in this branch of law.7 The way according to 
which rule (4) constructs new rules from existing primary rules is specific to 
commercial law. Rule (4) could be represented as 
analogy(rent): 
analogia_rule(rent, NewRule) + 
demo@, Rule) A 
subst([vendor = iZZ,vendee = hirer], Rule, NewRule) A 
NewRule = ConscAnte A 
not( Ante * completee(casuistic( rent), Cons)) A 
support&consumers, free_entetprisel, NewRule) A 
not contravenes([consumers, free-entetprisel, NewRule). 
(7) 
The theory casuistic(rent) consists of the literal reading of legal sources explicitly 
covering rental of goods. The theory rent is a virtual legal source comprising 
casuistic(rent) extended with rules computed by analogy from existing acts, in this 
case the Sale of Goods Act (sga). 
The new rule, which has the form C + A, is constructed to resolve the current 
case A. Compare the formal analogia-rule with the rule (4) (in Figure 1). The first 
three subgoals of the formal rule find an existing rule whose antecedent is similar 
to A but does not subsume it; the second subgoal captures the second premise of 
rule (4) [see program (8) for further details]. The fourth subgoal corresponds to the 
‘The subst predicate applies a generalized substitution (a, = p,, (Y* = &, . ) to a term, which may 
be a name. Every occurrence, if any, of the expression (Y, is replaced by pi, for each i. 
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first premise and reads “it may not be the case that, assuming A holds,’ 
casui.stic(rent) I- C or casuistic(rent) k --J C”, i.e., there may exist no explicit rule in 
rent that applies to A and yields C, in which case the new rule is redundant, or 
yields 7 C, in which case the new rule and A render rent inconsistent. Other rules 
with antecedent A may exist in rent. 
A constructed rule NewRule, computed by analogia-rulecrent, NewRule), belongs 
to the theory rent. This is expressed by the following secondary rule, part of its 
metatheory an&o&rent): 
analogy(rent): 
democrent, NewRule) + 
analogia_rule(rent, NewRule). 
Generalizing this secondary rule to arbitrary acts requires a tertiary clause, e.g., 
analogia-legis: 
demo(analogy(ActJ, 
demo(Act ’ , NewRule) + 
analogia_rule(Act, NewRule)) 
provided that analogia-legis is a metatheory for every theory analogy( *.. ). 
When the goal demo(sga, Rule) of the metaprogram (7) succeeds, binding the 
metavariable Rule to a name of the clause in program (61, the metavariable New 
Rule will be instantiated (by the subst goal) to the name 
presumed_delivered( Y, G) + 
letter( X, G) A 
hirer( Y, G) A 
shall_send_to( X, G, 0,) A 
shall_receive( Y, G, DI) A 
ought_to_be_sent_fiom( G, D2) A 
(left_to_an_independent_canying_trader( X, G, D2) A 
brought_within_planking_for_shipping( X, G, D2)), 
(6’) 
which represents the constructed primary rule (2) (in Figure 1). Note that, instead 
of transforming program (6) into program (6’), we could create both programs from 
a common schema by instantiation of metavariables (ranging over predicate names, 
here Role, and Role,). The schema should occur as a term in a metaprogram 
quantifying the metavariables. Such a program, with the same purpose as programs 
(7) and (6) taken together, could be represented as 
commercial: 
demo( Act, 
presumed_deliuered( Y, G) + 
Role,( X, G) A 
Role,( Y, G) A 
‘Operationally, a formula P *Q is proved by temporarily asserting P and then proving Q, cf. 
N-Prolog [15]. 
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shall-send_to( X,G, DI) A 
shall_receiue( Y,G, DI) A 
ought_to_be_sent_from( G, D2) A 
(lej?_to_an_independent_canying_trader( X, G, D2) V 
brought_within_planking_for_shipping( X, G, D2))) + 
commercial_roles( Role,, Role,, Act ). 
This metaprogram purports to say that we may use a rule of the form 
presumed_deliuered(Y,G) + o(X,G) A P(Y,G) A ..*, 
provided that (Y and p are predicate symbols that stand for roles in a commercial 
relationship, such as a vendor and a vendee, etc. 
This is also the meaning we would like to ultimately attach to the textual legal 
rules, such as the one formalized in program (6); recall that legal provisions, such 
as e.g., provision (1) (in Figure l), are correctly thought of not as rules, but only as 
schemata for rules (cf. Section 3). 
4.4. The Tertiary Ler?el 
At the tertiary level, metametaprograms represent tertiary rules. A tertiary rule 
being a statement about schemata for secondary rules (i.e., tertiary schemata; cf. 
Figure 2) corresponds to a metametaprogram being a statement about unsaturated 
names for metaprograms. 
The tertiary schema (3) is a general description of the form and content of 
secondary rules for analogia Zegis in all branches of law. Somewhat simplified, a 
name for its representation is included in the following metametaprogram, part of 
the theory analogia-legis: 
analogia-legis: 
demo(analogy (Act ‘r , 
analogia-nde(Act’, NewRule) + 
demo( SimilarAct” , Rule) A 
subst (Adaption’, Rule, NewRule) A 
NewRule = ConsttAnte A 
not( Ante 3 complete(casuistic( Act)” , Cons)) A 
supports(lnterests, NewRule) A 
not contravenes(Interests, NewRule)) + 
proposed_analogy(SimilarAct, Act, Adaption) A 
substantial_similatity( Adaption, SimilarAct, Act) A 
demo(about(SimilarAct ‘1, protected_interests( Interests]). 
(8) 
[Note that we have often collected the metaknowledge about a legal field or source, 
represented by a theory T, in a metatheory about(T).] 
4.5. The Quaternary Leuel 
In the same way in which some secondary rules could be generated from a common 
schema, it is also possible to generate some tertiary rules from schemata at the 
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quaternary level. Simple examples are tertiary rules for lex specialis legi generali 
derogat and lex posterior legi priori derogat [22]. We discuss possible levels above the 
tertiary elsewhere [21-241. 
5. A PROGRAMMED EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the ideas in the previous sections we have programmed an example. 
The example has been run in an experimental implementation of Alloy. In this 
presentation we have removed some parts and somewhat simplified others to 
facilitate presentation. We do not include the language processor itself nor the 
support code to communicate with the user interface. One should know, however, 
that we assume the existence of a theory user that is a metatheory to every theory. 
If a query is reflected up to user and there is a way to pose this question to the 
user, then the question is presented through the interface. The user can reply 
positively or negatively to the question, possibly also instantiating variables in it. 
He can also give a “don’t know” answer. His answers are considered the theorems 
of the theory user and are recorded to avoid repeating questions. 
The program tries to settle a case between a Mr. Smith, running a hardware 
store in Stockholm, and a Mr. Jones in Uppsala. Mr. Smith has let a chainsaw to 
Mr. Jones but has not delivered it on time. One week after the agreed delivery date 
the chainsaw is still not delivered. Mr. Jones wants to cancel the rental but finds 
that the contract he has signed says that he cannot do that unless the chainsaw has 
been overdue for at least two weeks. 
5.1 A Program in Alloy 
Let us begin with presenting the meta-theory relation that states the object-meta 
relationship between theories. If met a_theory ( T , U) holds between two theo- 
ries T and U, then, and only then, may a goal T: G be solved by solving U:demo 
(T, G). 
meta_theory(rent, analogybent)). 
meta_theory(crent, analogy(crent)). 
meta_theory(sga, aboudsga)). 
meta_theory(csga, aboudcsga)). 
meta-theory(rent, abodrent)). 
meta_theory(crent, about(crent>>. 
meta_theory(commercial-law, about(commercial_law)). 
meta-theory(purchase_law, about(purchase_law)). 
meta_theory(contract_law, about(contract_law)). 
meta_theory(rental_law, about(rental_law)). 
meta_theory(about(commercial-law), meta_jields). 
meta_theory(about(purchase_law), meta_jields>. 
meta_theory(about(contract-law), meta_felds>. 
meta_theory(about(rental_law), meta_fields). 
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met a_theory(cuwent_case, about(cun-ent-case)). 
meta_theory(about(current_case), meta_cases). 
meta_theory(analogy(Act), analogia_legis). 
meta_theory(about(rent), analogia_legis). 
meta_theory(about(crent), analogia_legis). 
met a-t heory(analogia_legis, about(analogia_legis>). 
We start the computation by asking, at the primary level, whether it is a theorem of 
current-case that Jones is entitled to cancel his rental of a chainsaw. 
user : 
start +- demo(current_case, entitled_to_cancel( ‘Jones’, chainsaw)). 
There are no useful explicit clauses in current-case; in fact, we assume it to be 
initially empty (but facts will be added to it indirectly through user queries; cf. 
preceding text). An attempt will be made to find a theorem of the form 
‘entitled_to_cancel(Y, G) + .+* ’ in current-case, to resolve with the original query. 
That goal will be reflected to the metatheory about(current_case), and further to 
the metametatheory meta_cases, which contains the clause 
meta_cases: 
-- 
demo(about(Case),demo(Case; Theorem]) * 
demo(about(Case],is_a_case) A 
demo(about( Case], relevant_source( Source)) A 
demo(Source, Theorem) A 
not( demo(about( CaseT, relevant_source(Another_Source]) A 
demo(&, ouem’des( Case; AnotherSource; Source]) A 
complete (AnotherSource, Theorem)). 
It uses some auxiliary (metalevel) predicates, relevant-source and overrides, to pick 
theorems (i.e., rules) from relevant legal sources, which are not overridden by more 
distinguished sources. 
The idea is to try each relevant act of each legal field that is applicable to the 
case and verify that it is not overridden by another such act. We also take contracts 
into consideration. Contracts override “optional” legal sources but are themselves 
overridden by “mandatory” sources. For example, in Swedish legislation consumer 
law is normally mandatory and so cannot be made void through contracts. More 
specific law also overrides more general law. There are other such relationships 
between legal sources, but we have restricted ourselves to these in our program: 
meta-cases: 
demo(about(Case~,relevant_source(Act~) + 
demo(&,legal-field(Field]] A 
demo(about(Field], applicable_for(Case~) A 
demo(about( FieldT, relevant_act(Act~ Case] ) & 
demo(about( Case), relevant_source( contract) (Contractn) + 
demo(about( Case], relevant_contract( ContractJ). 
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meta-fields: 
demo(about(Field~,releuant_act(Act~Case~) + 
demo(about(Field),encompasses(AnotherField]) A 
demo(&,legal_field(AnotherField]) A 
demo(about (AnotherField), applicable_for( Case]) A 
demo(about(AnotherField),relevant_act(Acti Case]) & 
demo(about(Field~,relevant_act(Act;Case~) + 
demo(about (FieldJ, encompasses( Act]) A 
demo(law,legal_act(Act)) A 
demo(about(Act),releuant_for(Case]) & 
demo(about( Fieldi, applicable-for (Case]) * 
demo(law, legal_field( Field)) A 
demo(about(CaseJ,applicable(Field]). 
law: 
ocerrides(Case, contract(Contract), Source) + 
demo(about (Case’], releuant_contract( Contract ‘1) A 
demo(about(Source’i,optional) & 
overrides(Case, Source, contract(Contract)) + 
demo(about(Source’J,mandatoy) & 
overrides(Case, Source, contract(Contract)) +- 
not demo(about(Source’r,optimal) & 
ovem.des(Case, SpecialSource, GeneralSource) + 
legal_field( Field) A 
demo(about (Field ‘1, encompasses( SpecialSource’)) A 
demo(about( Field ‘1, encompasses( GeneralSource’]) A 
demo(about(SpecialSource’~,specializes(GeneralSource’)). 
It turns out that the two relevant “acts” are the virtual legal sources rent and crent, 
which are the analogues of sga (Sale of Goods Act) and csga (Consumer Sale of 
Goods Act) for rental of goods, rather than sale of goods. The theories rent and 
crent have no explicit theorems, but there are the following tertiary rules in 
analogiaalegis that define theorems of analogy(rent> and analogy(crent), which in 
turn “translate” theorems of sga and csga into theorems of rent and crent, 
respectively: 
analogia-legis: 
demo(analogy(ActJ, 
demo(Act ’ , NewRule) + 
analogia_rule(Act, NewRule)) & 
demo(analogy(Act’], 
analogia_rule(Act ’ , NewRule) + 
demo( SimilarAct” , Rule) A 
subst (Adaption’, Rule, NewRule) A 
NewRule = ConscAnte A 
not( Ante * complete(casuistic(ActY’ , Cons)) A 
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supports( Interests, NewRule) A 
not contravenes( Interests, NewRule)) t 
proposed_analogy( SimilarAct, Act, Adaption) A 
substantial_similan’ty( Adaption, SimilarAct, Act > A 
demo(about(SimilarAct ‘1, protected_interests( Interests~). 
The theory analogia-legis also contains information on how theorems about 
theories (such as being optional or mandatory) can be drawn by analogy: 
analogia-legis: 
demo(about(Act ‘7, PropertyOfAct) + 
demo(about( SimilarAct ‘1, PropertyOfAct) A 
transferable_propertyty( PropettyOfAct) A 
proposed_analogyWnilarAct, Act, Adaption) A 
substantial_similarity~ Adaption, SimilarAct, Act) & 
transferable_property(pVr) & 
transferable_propeqy(mandato?y) & 
transferable_proper&@ZGE$0 & 
transferable-property (relevant-for ( -1) & 
transferable_propeityty(l Prop> + transferable_propeq( Prop>. 
In the information about rent and crent is included the known similarity with sga 
and csga, expressed as substitutions (we expect that the process of “translating” 
rules will often be more complex than mere substitution, but that could be handled 
as well): 
ana Iogia-legis : 
proposed-analogycsga, rent, [vendor = letter, vendee = EG]) & 
proposed-analogyccsga, crent, [vendor = EGG, vendee = ZG]). 
Here is some (metahnformation about sga, csga, and crent: 
about(sga): 
optional & 
protected_interests([fiee_enterprise]). 
about(csga): 
mandatory & 
specializes(sga) & 
protected_interests([consumers, free_enterprise]> & 
relevant_for(Field) + 
demo(about(Field’~, consumer_involved). 
The interpretation of a legal act comprises much more than the casuistic (literal) 
reading, indeed the casuistic reading may not even be acceptable. However, for 
simplicity, in this example we include the casuistic interpretation for any act: 
meta-sources: 
demo(about( Act -), 
demo(Act, Theorem) 
legal_act( Act). 
+ demo( casuistic( Act), Theorem)) t 
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We have included a theory law, which contains well known information about legal 
fields and their corresponding sources. We present here only that part of law that 
is relevant for the example: 
law: 
legal_~eld(commercial_law) & 
legal_Jield(purchase_law) & 
legal_jield(contract_law) & 
legal_field(rental_iaw) & 
legul_act(csga) & 
legal_act(sga) & 
legul_act(crent) & 
legul_act(rent) & 
legaLact & 
legal_act(standard_contracts). 
There is also other information about which legal acts are encompassed by certain 
legal fields. We have chosen to structure this knowledge in such a way that the 
theorems about each field are in separate theories: 
about(commercial_law): 
encompasses(purchase_law) & 
encompasses(contract_law) & 
encompasses(rental_law). 
about(purchase_luw): 
encompasses(csga) & 
encompasses(sga). 
about(contract_law): 
encompasses 4% 
encompasses(standard_contracts). 
about(rental_law): 
encompasses(rent) & 
encompasses(crent1. 
The explicit rules of sgu and csgu that we have included are 
casuistic(sgu): 
presumed_delivered(Y, G) + 
vendor(X, G) A vendee(Y, G) A 
shall_send_to(X, G, 0,) A shall_receive(Y, G, 0,) A 
ought_to_besent_from(G, 0,) A 
(lef_to_an_independent_canying_trader( X, G, 0,) V 
brought_within_pZanking_for_shipping(X, G, 0,)) & 
presumed_deliveredCY, G) + 
vendor-(X, G) A vendee(Y, G) A 
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effect_deliuery_to(X, G, Y > A in_possession(Y, G) & 
runs_risk( W, G) + 
vendor-(X, G) A vendee(Y, G) A 
(not presumed_delivered(Y, G) A W = X V 
specific__goods(G) A may_call_for_delivety(Y, G, T) A 
available (G, T) A W = Y) & 
entitled_to_cancel(Y, G) + 
vendor-(X, G) A vendee(Y, G) A 
not delivered_on_time(X, G) A 
(runs_risk(X, G) V not runs_rtsk(Y, G)). 
casuistic(csga): 
entitled_to_cancel(Y, G) + 
vendor(X, G) A vendee(Y, G) A 
not delivered_on_time(X, G) A 
(runs_risk(X, G) V not runs_risk(Y, G)). 
The critical clause of the contract says that the customer is not entitled to cancel 
the rental until a fortnight has passed since the agreed delivery date. It will be 
overridden by the clause in crent, translated from the preceding clause in csga: 
contract(chainsaw_rental): 
entitled_to_cancel(Y, G) + 
letter-(X, G) A hirer(Y, G) A 
may_call_for_delivey(Y, G, T) A U is T + 14 A not available(G, U). 
Finally, this clause says that current-case is a theory about a legal case: 
about(cun-ent_case): 
is-a-case. 
5.2. An Earlier Program 
We originally realized these ideas using a somewhat different style of programming 
and it is interesting to compare the two. Whereas the present program begins 
running at the object level and automatically invokes the metalevel to construct 
some program clause that is required, the first program begins running at the 
topmost metalevel and constructs, as a data structure, a whole lower level theory 
and then queries it. Such a query may in turn construct a lower level theory and 
query it, etc. 
That original approach never used meta-to-object reflection, but only an explicit 
object-to-meta reflection, and could therefore be incorporated in a metalogic 
programming language that lacks meta-to-object reflection (i.e., most proposed 
metalogic programming languages). 
The original approach was such that it was up to the programmer to manage 
theories, because they were data structures in the program. The present approach 
leaves the management of theories to the language processor. An advanced 
implementation of Alloy can use partial evaluation and related techniques to 
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precompute some object level information, and may choose to keep an internal 
representation of previously computed clauses of theories. 
The present program is no doubt more comprehensible than the original 
program. This is probably because the original program had to build theories as 
data structures. If the clauses in these theories themselves referred to other 
theories, which in turn must be built, then the structure of the program became 
quite complex. Alloy, on the other hand, allows theories to be described in a 
simpler way, although it lacks some of the power of the original approach, e.g., it is 
more difficult to express a theory that is a restriction of another theory. 
5.3. Using Gijdel 
Gddel is a logic programming language intended to replace many of Prolog’s 
impurities with similar facilities having a logical reading [27]. In particular, it 
replaces many of Prolog’s metaprogramming features with predicates that operate 
upon a ground representation of programs. Unlike, e.g., Reflective Prolog, this 
ground representation is realized through abstract data types that have no defined 
syntax, which means that metaprograms cannot use unification to work on names. 
Verdickt [40] attempted to implement our representation of analogia leg& in 
Godel. The work was seriously troubled by problems in the implementation of 
Gijdel that was current at that time, but it became clear that Godel was not 
particularly suited for this task. 
When using the original approach, a major problem was the representation of 
theories. Neither Godel’s predefined theory module nor its language module or the 
module system itself was useful for the purpose. The only possibility was to define a 
completely new data type for some language, including theories, and an interpreter 
for that language. This was not very efficient and hardly more convenient than 
writing the same program in Prolog. 
Implementing our present approach was even more cumbersome, because 
Giidel’s module system does not allow circular references between modules. A 
representation of a language (similar to Alloy) and an interpreter for it had to be 
devised and everything placed in a single module. 
In conclusion, Verdickt found no way of directly expressing the knowledge as 
Giidel program clauses that could be run efficiently. A partial evaluator might 
remove most of the overhead of an interpreter, but such techniques are not quite 
mature yet. It should be noted that there have recently been some further 
developments of Godel that may, at least partially, solve the problems experienced. 
6. RELATED WORK 
We are aware of some other work using metaprogramming in logic for representa- 
tion of legal knowledge or performing metareasoning in this domain. 
Nitta et al. [34] present a system in which legal metaknowledge for control is 
incorporated, but where legal metaknowledge for interpreting provisions is treated 
extrasystematically by selecting the “opinion which is supported by many legal 
scholars.” 
Metaprogramming in logic was touched upon in Sergot’s project on representa- 
tion of statute law in logic programming [36] (the British Nationality Act). Sergot 
et al. present solutions to some problems and outline how representation of more 
advanced legal knowledge could be approached, e.g., deeming provisions and 
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counterfactuals, a thread later picked up, elaborated, and to some extent realized, 
by Routen [35], and negation, which was followed up later by Kowalski [30]. 
Allen and Saxon [l] discuss assistance for coping with problems of multiple 
interpretations of provisions. In passing they mention the problem of alternative 
semantic interpretations, but focus on structural interpretation, i.e., the incorpora- 
tion of various understandings of structural components, such as “if,” “not,” 
“provided that,” e.g., those arising from altering the choice of component taken 
as the main connective of a sentence. No analysis is presented of the logical 
relationship between theories comprising interpretative knowledge and interpreted 
theories. 
Costantini and Lanzarone have studied analogical reasoning for case law [ll]. 
The approach taken in their example is primarily that of finding analogies between 
properties of the objects in a precedent case and of the objects in a case to be 
settled. They also discuss how these analogies can be represented in the metalogic 
programming language Reflective Prolog. 
A natural trade-off exists between automatization and accuracy in imprecise 
domains such as law. This can be illustrated by comparing our work with that of 
Hamfelt and Hansson 121, 241. Whereas our work emphasizes automatization, their 
work stresses accuracy. 
To establish the meaning of the expressions involved, i.e., to interpret the 
domain knowledge, is an important part of the problem solving process in an 
imprecise domain. With a possible exception for the inference rules of logic, no 
knowledge can really be exempted from this. Our system leaves many rules without 
such interpretation, however, and assigns instead a fixed meaning to them in the 
formalization. Interpretation problems are considered only if central and when 
likely to attract interests in legal consultation. In Hamfelt and Hansson’s system, 
the interpretation requirement is taken more ad notum. No rules are left for a 
purely formal treatment. Before the rules are used in mechanized reasoning, an 
external observer participates in establishing their meaning. At the cost of a more 
frequent user interaction, a more accurate representation of the domain knowl- 
edge is obtained. It is worth mentioning a particular consequence of the different 
emphases on automatization and accuracy in the respective systems. Our system 
contains several mutually conflicting metatheories for interpretation, because a 
fixed meaning has been given to the rules in these theories at programming time. 
In Hamfelt and Hansson’s system, in contrast, no rules exist beforehand. When the 
program is run, a single consistent metatheory for each level is built from 
schemata. Inconsistency is avoided because the metatheory obtained must accord 
with interpretation principles at the higher adjacent level, a theory that in turn is 
built from schemata at the next higher level, etc. Whether it is appropriate to 
emphasize automatization or accuracy in a practical system depends on several 
parameters, e.g., on the user’s readiness to accept deviations from accuracy and his 
ability to assess the accuracy of the formal theory from which the system infers its 
conclusions. 
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
In this paper we have described a representation of legal knowledge in a runnable 
metalogic. We have showed that our representation suffices for reflecting some 
important aspects of legal reasoning. In particular, we have demonstrated how legal 
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hermeneutics, i.e., the principles for how to interpret various legal sources such as 
provisions, cases, etc., may be incorporated in the representation. Several problems 
and interesting questions remain, however, for further research. 
Our formalization includes only a few higher level rules. We believe that many 
secondary and some tertiary rules may be added without serious problems. 
Schematic descriptions of higher level rules can be found in legal philosophy, in 
particular in the important and comprehensive branch called legal hermeneutics. 
An additional observation is that tertiary schemata may express the essence of 
many secondary rules, quaternary schemata the essence of many tertiary rules, etc. 
Formulating these schemata is worthwhile because (1) it may not be necessary to 
represent the lower level rules explicitly (cf. the quaternary rule covering lex 
specialis legi generali derogat and lex posterior legi priori derogat accounted for 
previously [20, 221) and (2) when existing lower level rules fall short, a higher level 
rule may still be applicable for generating additional lower level rules. 
In this work and elsewhere [22] we have studied relationships, such as analogies, 
between provisions. Another interesting area would be similar relationships between 
legal cases. 
We are convinced that knowledge in many areas (including so-called common 
sense knowledge) has a multilayered structure and that many of our ideas for 
representing legal knowledge can be used in other domains. 
Using ordinary Prolog for metaprogramming requires great care and sacrifices 
of efficiency. Further developments of logic programming languages will certainly 
include better facilities for metaprogramming, such as clean and efficient represen- 
tation of names, integration of Demo solvers, implicit or explicit linking rules, etc. 
Some of these facilities can already be found in, e.g., Reflective Prolog [lOI and 
Metaprolog [5]; our experimental Alloy language represents even further steps in 
this direction. 
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